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Modern organisations are complex, socio-technical systems consisting of a
mixture of physical infrastructure, human actors, policies and processes. An in-
creasing number of attacks on these organisations exploits vulnerabilities on all
different levels, for example combining a malware attack with social engineer-
ing. Due to this combination of attack steps on technical and social levels, risk
assessment in socio-technical systems is complex. Therefore, established risk as-
sessment methods often abstract away the internal structure of an organisation
and ignore human factors when modelling and assessing attacks. In our work
we model all relevant levels of socio-technical systems, and propose evaluation
techniques for analysing the security properties of the model. Our approach sim-
plifies the identification of possible attacks and provides qualified assessment and
ranking of attacks based on the expected impact.
We demonstrate our approach on a home-payment system. The system is
specifically designed to help elderly or disabled people, who may have difficul-
ties leaving their home, to pay for some services, e.g., care-taking or rent. The
payment is performed using the remote control of a television box with a con-
tactless payment card (see Figure 1). When a transfer is initiated, a password is
needed in order to authenticate the owner of the card.
Fig. 1. System overview.
Model
Our model is based on work by Probst et al. [1] and Dimkov et al. [2]. To facilitate
formal methods, the model represents the infrastructure of organisations - the
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physical as well as the digital world - as nodes in a directed graph. In this directed
graph nodes that are physically or virtually connected are linked by directed
edges. The nodes represent different elements in the modelled organisation such
as locations, assets, and actors. Nodes may belong to different domains. Domains
are used to restrict operations being allowed on the nodes. For example, human
actors are only allowed to move within the nodes from the physical domain. Some
nodes are associated with policies, which are used for regulating the access to
locations and assets, but also for defining actors’ expected behaviour in the
organisation. Policies consist of two parts - required credentials and enabled
actions. The actor needs to fulfill the required credentials in order to be permitted
to perform the enabled actions on the respective node.
The example scenario, also shown in Figure 2, represents an actor Alice,
who receives a care-taking service provided by an actor Charlie. The company
Charlie works for has a policy that forbids the employees to take money from
the customers. The locations modelled in this scenario are Alice’s home, a bank
with an ATM, and a bank computer. Alice’s payment card, the pin it contains,
and the pin Alice knows for her card are modeled as assets. An example for a
node associated with a policy is the bank computer, where the policy requires a
bank account and a matching password.
In order to identify the possible attacks based on the model, our approach
does not analyse only the technical infrastructure but also takes into consider-
ation the human factor. Social attacks, e.g., social engineering, are an essential
component as attack threats could be easily underseen when only technical at-
tacks are considered. The human factor modelling in technical systems is also
formally presented using Isabelle theorem prover [3].
Analysis
Our analysis is carried out on attack trees, a suitable tool for presenting socio-
technical threats and conveying security information to non-experts. Attack
trees, introduced by Schneier [4], are a widely used graphical tool for represent-
ing attack scenarios. They are used to evaluate the security of complex systems
in a structured, hierarchical way. The root of a tree represents the main goal
of the attacker, while the leaves are the attacker’s basic actions. Internal nodes
illustrate how the basic actions have to be combined in order to achieve the
overall goal. Standard attack trees combine basic actions either conjunctively,
meaning that all actions should be satisfied in order the tree to be satisfied, or
disjunctively, meaning that at least one action should be satisfied in order the
tree to be satisfied.
Attack trees are analysed by assigning values to the basic actions and prop-
agating them from the leaves to the root of the tree. Most attack tree analyses
consider attack trees with one parameter and optimise one particular aspect of
a scenario, such as likelihood of success or difficulty of a hack, in terms of time
or cost of an attack. Moreover, in most attack tree models with multiple param-
eters values are propagating from the leaves to the root based on local decision
strategies, i.e., in each step of the evaluation optimisation is made with respect
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Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the example system. The white rectangles represent
locations or items, the gray rectangles represent processes and actors; actors contain
the items or data owned by the actor. The round nodes represent data. Solid lines
represent the physical connections between locations, and dotted lines represent the
present location of actors and processes. The dashed rectangles in the upper right part
of some nodes represent the policies assigned to these nodes.
to one parameter. In case of incomparable values, however, this approach may
yield sup-optimal results.
In order to overcome this limitation and evaluate complex attack scenarios,
we present evaluation techniques that consider attack trees where basic actions
are assigned with more than one parameter, such as, likelihood of success and
cost. Our evaluation techniques try to optimise all parameters at once. How-
ever, optimisation of multiple parameters might lead to incomparable values,
e.g., maximising likelihood while minimising cost. Even worse, a best solution
does not always exist. We handle this issue by computing the set of optimal
solutions [5], defined in terms of Pareto efficiency. A solution is called Pareto
efficient if it is not dominated by any other solution [6].
Evaluation
We illustrate the evaluation techniques on the attack scenario where an attacker
wants to steal money from the card-holder by forcing him/her to pay fake ser-
vices. Our evaluation techniques answer the questions, such as “Can an attacker
successfully steal money from the card-holder?” or “What is the maximum like-
lihood of success of an attack?”. Moreover, we associate with each basic action a
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cost of an attack, and detected the attacks with maximum likelihood and min-
imum cost. We compute the set of all Pareto optimal solutions, displayed in
Figure 3, where each point shows a likelihood of success with the corresponding
cost.
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Fig. 3. Pareto optimal solutions.
As future work, we plan to introduce countermeasures to the model. Besides
the identification of possible socio-technical threats, we would like to determine
the corresponding defender actions and evaluate attack and defence scenarios.
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